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Torts-STATE TORT IMMUNITY EXTENDED TO ADMINISTRATORS AND INTERN OF
STATE SUPPORTED HOSPITAL- Lawhorne v. Harlan, 214 Va. 405, 200 S.E.2d
509 (1973).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity as developed in England and
adopted in the United States has its roots in feudalism.' While it is not
clear how this monarchistic doctrine came to be adopted in the new and
belligerently democratic republic of America, 2 it has become firmly en-
trenched in our jurisprudential system.3 Sovereign immunity as applied to
tort actions means that the state, in consequence of its sovereignty, is
immune from liability for negligence, except where it has expressly waived
immunity by legislative enactment or judicial decision.' While the Federal
Tort Claims Act waives federal tort immunity in certain situations, 5 the
1. The idea that the King can do no wrong was an application of the feudal principle that
a lord could not be sued in his own courts. The King, as the apex of the feudal structure,
was the "fountain head of justice" and was thus subject to the jurisdiction of no court. 3 W.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 460-63 (3d ed. 1923).
2. In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) Chief Justice Marshall declared
that no suit could be instituted against the United States without its consent. Although this
is the first appearance of the sovereign immunity rule in Supreme Court decisions, no reasons
were advanced for its adoption. It has been suggested that the sovereign immunity rule was
adopted in the United States due to the heavy public debts and generally precarious financial
condition of the nation in the years immediately following the Revolution. It was feared that
the financial burden of adverse tort judgments could not be sustained. Gellhorn & Schenck,
Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 722 (1947).
3. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196
(1882); Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386 (1850); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264 (1821).
4. Faber v. State, 143 Colo. 240, 353 P.2d 609 (1960); Condon v. State, 169 Misc. 666, 8
N.Y.S.2d 544 (1938); Holzworth v. State, 238 Wis. 63, 298 N.W. 163 (1941). See notes 5 and
6 infra.
5. The Federal Tort Claims Act (1945) makes the United States liable under the law of
the place where the tort occurs for the negligent or wrongful act or omission of federal
employees within the scope of their employment ". . . [I]n the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. . . " 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b),
2674 (1948). The act does, however, continue immunity as to certain specific governmental
activities, such as the activities of the armed forces in time of war. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(0)
(1948). See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). The two other exceptions to the
general federal tort liability created by the act are more comprehensive. One provides that
the United States shall not be liable for any international tort. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(h) (1948).
See Fletcher v. Veterans Adm., 103 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. Mich. 1952). Far more sweeping is
the exception which provides that the United States shall not be liable for acts done with
due care in the execution of a statute, or for acts or omissions which are within the "discre-
tionary function or duty" of any federal employee or agency. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) (1948).
The leading case of Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) is an excellent example of
the application of § 2680(a).
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states have generally been reluctant to take similar action.6
Sovereign immunity extends both to agencies of the state7 and to state
agents and employees! Under the majority and Virginia view, however, the
protection afforded state agents and employees is not absolute, but de-
pends upon whether the act performed is "discretionary" or "ministerial."
Discretionary acts require personal deliberation or decision on the part of
the agent, i.e., the employee must exercise his judgment as to the manner
in which he executes his duties.' Ministerial acts are those which demand
6. All states have, to a greater or lesser extent, granted consent to be sued, but few have
swept aside sovereign immunity as dramatically as did the Federal Tort Claims Act. For an
exhaustive though somewhat dated summary of the statutes and common law of each state
dealing with sovereign immunity, see Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29
N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 1363 (1954). For a list of those states which have by judicial decision
abrogated sovereign immunity, see note 28 infra.
The reluctance of the states to relax their sovereign immunity can be credited to three
factors: (1) the amorphous mass of unworkable self-contradicting language with which one is
confronted when dealing with the rule and which is contradicted by modem legislation such
as the Federal Tort Claims Act; (2) legislative and judicial inertia; (3) fears that the states
could not afford to shoulder the burden of the expenditures which would be required should
tort claims be allowed. Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. INwRA.
L. REv. 1363, 1364 (1954).
7. See, e.g., Moody v. State's Prison, 128 N.C. 12, 38 S.E. 131 (1901) (prison); Rader v.
Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 407 Pa. 609, 182 A.2d 199 (1962) (commission for public
works); Jones v. Jones, 243 S.C. 600, 135 S.E.2d 233 (1964) (hospital); Alston v. Waldon
Acad., 118 Tenn. 24, 102 S.W. 351 (1907) (educational institution); Maia's Adm'r v. Eastern
State Hosp., 97 Va. 507, 34 S.E. 617 (1899) (refusing to allow recovery against a state hospital
for the wrongful death of an inmate) (the Maia's Adm'r case laid down the rule in Virginia
that an agency of the state government is immune from suit in tort). See also Phillips v.
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 97 Va. 472, 34 S.E. 66 (1899) (state supported
educational institution similarly protected).
8. Unqualified sovereign immunity has been granted only to higher echelon state officials.
See, e.g., Paoli v. Mason, 325 Ill. App. 197, 59 N.E.2d 499 (1945) (Liquor Control Commis-
sioner held not liable for wrongful revocation of liquor license regardless of malicious con-
duct); Schwartz v. Heffernan, 304 N.Y. 474, 109 N.E.2d 68 (1952) (members of election board
not liable for declaring an alleged valid nominating petition invalid). As to agent and employ-
ees of lower rank, see text and notes 9 and 10 infra.
9. See, e.g., Wilson v. Hirst, 67 Ariz. 197, 193 P.2d 461, (1948). In holding the members
of a hospital board not liable for wrongful conduct in their discharge of an employee, the court
said:
In effect, the state says to the officer that these duties are confided to his judgment;
that he is to exercise his judgment fully, freely, and without favor, and he may
exercise it without fear; that the duties concern individuals, but they concern more
especially the welfare of the state, and the peace and happiness of society; . . . [Iln
order that he may not be annoyed, disturbed, and impeded in the performance of these
high functions, a dissatisfied individual shall not be suffered to call in question his
official action in a suit for damages. . . . Id. at 462-63.
Stevens v. North States Motor Co., 161 Minn. 345, 201 N.W. 435 (1925) (In constructing a
highway, the degree of embankment required for a curve involves the discretion of the high-
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only obedience to orders or in which the agent is left with no choice of his
own, unqualifiedly calling for the doing of a certain thing.' Liability is
imposed upon the state employee only for negligent performance of minis-
terial acts. Since this distinction is at best one of degree, difficulty has
been experienced in deciding how to distinguish discretionary and minis-
terial acts," and different decisions have flowed from similar factual situa-
tions. 2 Difficult to apply as sovereign immunity appears to be, few viable
alternatives have been advanced. 3
With some qualifications, the sovereign immunity doctrine is firmly
embraced by Virginia. 4 The immunity granted state agents and employees
way official in charge, and damages for injuries resulting from negligent discharge of that duty
cannot be recovered from him); Harmer v. Peterson, 151 Neb. 412, 37 N.W.2d 511 (1949) (In
deciding where to construct a bridge, a road overseer was exercising discretionary powers, and
he was held not liable for consequential water damage to plaintiff's adjacent property). See
Sayers v. Bullar, 180 Va. 222, 22 S.E.2d 9 (1942), notes 20 and 25 infra.
10. See, e.g., Whitt v. Reed, 239 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1951) (duty to cut off boiling water
improperly attached to drinking fountain was ministerial only, requiring no exercise of judge-
ment); Tholkes v. Decock, 125 Minn. 507, 147 N.W. 648 (1914) (duty to repair hole left in
highway by culvert removal was ministerial only); Wynn v. Gandy, 170 Va. 590, 197 S.E. 527
(1938) (In his failure to observe proper caution upon approaching an unruly group of children
on a curb, the driver of a school bus was negligent in the discharge of a duty in which no
discretion on his part was required, i.e. a ministerial duty, and consequently the protection
of sovereign immunity was not available to him).
11. In grappling with the problem of whether the failure to promptly repair a bridge which
had been partially damaged by a storm involved a ministerial or a discretionary duty, the
court in Ham v. Los Angeles County, 46 Cal. App. 148, 162, 189 P. 462, 468 (1920) said:
[lIt would be difficult to conceive of any official act, no matter how directly minis-
terial, that did not admit of some discretion in its manner of performance, even if it
involved only the driving of a nail."
12. See, e.g., as to the acts of state auditors in issuing and paying warrants, the opposing
views expressed in Fergus v. Brady, 277 Ill. 272, 115 N.E. 393 (1917) (ministerial only) and
Hicks v. Davis, 100 Kan. 4, 163 P. 799 (1917) (discretionary).
13. Some writers have suggested a simple test as to whether the agent has acted with due
care in the performance of his duties without consideration of the nature of those duties. Gray,
Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 303 (1959); Jennings, Tort Liability of
Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REv. 263 (1937); Mathes and Jones, Toward a "Scope
of Official Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in Damage Actions, 53 GEO. L.J. 889 (1965).
A few cases have shown a tendency to move in this direction. See Silva v. MacAuley, 135
Cal. App. 249, 27 P.2d 791 (1933) (defendant officers held liable for damages resulting from
their negligence; no consideration given to the ministerial-discretionary test); Wallace v.
Feehan, 181 N.E. 862 (Ind. App. 1932) (officers held liable solely on the basis of negligence
for unnecessary destruction of a field of corn). See also Tyrell v. Burke, 110 N.J.L. 225, 164
A. 586 (1933); Lincoln Bus Co. v. Jersey Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 1114, 162 A. 915
(1932).
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-752 (Cum. Supp. 1973) provides for recovery of contract claims
against the Commonwealth. That statute has, however, been consistently interpreted as not
permitting tort actions. In Commonwealth v. Chilton Malting Co., 154 Va. 28, 152 S.E. 336
(1930) the court held that while VA. CODE ANN. § 2578 (1919) (now VA. CODE ANN. § 8-752
1974]
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in Virginia has generally followed the pattern of that of the majority of
jurisdictions,'" but it has not been developed without some uncertainty.'6
In the recent Virginia decision of Lawhorne v. Harlan," the Supreme Court
of Virginia again addressed itself to this issue.
In Lawhorne the plaintiffs decedent allegedly died as a result of a delay
in the diagnosing and treatment of a skull fracture, the presence of which
the defendant, an intern at the University of Virginia hospital, had negli-
gently failed to discover from x-rays taken upon the decedent's admission
to the hospital emergency room. The plaintiff further alleged negligence
of the defendant hospital and its administrators by virtue of the inade-
quate procedures employed to prevent such occurrences and the hospital's
failure to notify the patient after the error was discovered.',
In sustaining the pleas of sovereign immunity of each of the defendants,
the court noted that under Virginia law a hospital which is an agency of
the state is immune from tort actions.'9 The court also held that an em-
ployee of a state agency who performs "supervisory functions" or exercises
"discretionary judgment" in the execution of his duties is entitled to
(1950)) authorized actions on contracts against the state, it did not authorize tort actions.
See also Sayers v. Bullar, 180 Va. 222, 22 S.E.2d 9 (1942).
The following narrow statutory provisions provide for limited recoveries from the Common-
wealth:
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-291 (1950) provides that cities and towns operating swimming pools
and other recreational facilities shall be liable for gross negligence but not for ordinary
negligence; VA. CODE ANN. § 22-290 (1950) requires all school boards operating school buses
to carry insurance on them, but the school board shall not be liable above the statutory
amount (as to the required amounts, see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-285 and 286 (1950)); VA. CODE
ANN. § 33.1-200 (1950) authorizes the State Highway Commissioner in his discretion to pay
claims arising against the Commonwealth as a result of damage caused to personal property
by reason of highway work provided such demands do not arise as a result of the negligence
of the person asserting such claim. The statute expressly negates legal liability and state
suability.
15. See notes 7, 9 and 10 supra.
16. While the development of the discretionary employees rule in Virginia law has not been
rapid, the general pattern laid down in the majority of jurisdictions has, as mentioned above,
been adhered to. However, in 1968 in Crabbe v. School Bd., 209 Va. 356, 164 S.E.2d 639
(1968); Annot., 33 A.L.R.3rd 697 (1968), the supreme court cast a bit of confusion onto the
scene. For a full discussion of this case, see note 27 infra.
17. 214 Va. 405, 200 S.E.2d 569 (1973).
18. The x-rays, taken on March 8th, 1970, revealed a skull fracture, but the decedent's
mother, who accompanied him, was not so advised. The decedent and his mother were
advised that "nothing was wrong" with the decedent. Not until March 10th when the dece-
dent's condition worsened was the fracture discovered. The decedent died on March 24th
allegedly as a result of the delay in diagnosing and treating this skull fracture.
19. Id. at 407, 200 S.E.2d at 571. See Maia's Adm'r v. Eastern State Hosp., 97 Va. 507, 34
S.E. 617 (1899), note 7 supra.
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similar protection,2 0 but that one whose task is "ministerial" acts negli-
gently at his peril.'
The court held that the hospital administrators were exercising discre-
tionary powers in performing their duties,2 but did not elaborate on this
point.2 3 The intern also was performing discretionary duties since his pri-
mary task in the emergency room was to treat incoming patients and
determine whether their injuries would require hospitalization.24 The court
concluded that an employee of an agency of the Commonwealth who per-
forms discretionary acts in the execution of his duties is entitled to the
protection of the state's sovereign immunity unless he has committed an
intentional tort or has been so negligent as to take his conduct outside of
the scope of his employment.2 5
Lawhorne provides a summary of all of the various aspects of the discre-
20. 214 Va. at 407, 200 S.E.2d at 571. The opinion cites two cases in support of this
statement. In Richmond v. Long's Adm'rs, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 375 (1867), the court mentions
the "discretionary" rule, but the discussion, though analogous to the present rule, is con-
cerned with the liability of municipal corporations for the negligent acts of its employees
rather than the circumstances under which the employees might be held personally liable.
Long is therefore not clear authority for the court's position.
In Sayers v. Bullar, 180 Va. 222, 22 S.E.2d 9 (1942) the plaintiff was seeking damages from
two state employees who, while routing a water pipe through limestone on the plaintiff's
property to a state fish hatchery used dynamite charges which caused the plaintiff's well to
cease to flow. The court held that the location of the pipe was a decision requiring an exercise
of judgment on the employee's part, and that they should not be held liable therefor. This
is more nearly the "discretion" rule as applied in Lawhorne.
21. 214 Va. at 407, 200 S.E.2d at 571. The opinion here cites three earlier decisions, most
notable of which is Wynn v. Gandy, 170 Va. 590, 197 S.E. 527 (1938). See note 10 supra.
22. 214 Va. at 407, 200 S.E.2d at 572.
23. Id. The court said merely that their conclusion was "clear" or, in other words, was
unquestionably compelled by the facts. The only substantive explanation given was that
public policy dictates that this should be the rule. Apparently the court felt that the defen-
dants' duties were necessarily discretionary due to the nature of the positions which they held.
24. Id. at 408, 200 S.E.2d at 572. The court held that the intern was "vested with and
required to exercise discretion and judgment in connection with those persons who presented
themselves as patients at the emergency room of the hospital. In performing these duties he
was required, in the exercise of his best judgment, either to treat and release the patients or
to treat and admit them to the hospital."
25. Id. at 407-08, 200 S.E.2d at 571-72. These "exceptions" to the discretionary employees
rule, i.e., intentional torts and gross negligence, are widely recognized and are generally
justified on the basis that when a state employee acts thusly he acts outside of the scope of
his employment and his acts are no longer those of the state. See Sayers v. Bullar, 180 Va.
222, 22 S.E.2d 9 (1942) in which the court, citing from the defendants brief, said, that "[tihe
true rule would seem to require proof (and allegation) of some act done by the employee
outside of the scope of his authority, or of some act. . . performed so negligently that it can
be said that its negligent performance takes him who did it outside the protection of his
employment." Id. at 229, 22 S.E.2d at 12. See note 20 supra.
1974]
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tionary employees rule in Virginia,"6 and to that extent the previously
mentioned uncertainty associated therewith has been lessened.17 Regret-
fully, Lawhorne provides no test to distinguish discretionary from minis-
terial acts. 2 Determination of the character of various acts will still cause
uncertainty in the application of sovereign immunity.
The sovereign immunity doctrine has come under attack in recent years
and its abolition may ultimately occur in a majority of the states in this
26. Not until Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 155 S.E.2d 369 (1967), cited in Lawhorne, 214
Va. at 407, 200 S.E.2d at 572, in which a state police officer was sued for defamation, was it
firmly established that sovereign immunity is not available to a state agent who commits an
intentional tort. Wynn v. Gandy, 170 Va. 590, 197 S.E. 527 (1938) cited in Lawhorne, 214
Va. at 407, 200 S.E.2d at 572, represents the first unequivocal statement of the ministerial
employees rule (see note 10 supra). Only in Sayers v. Bullar, 180 Va. 222, 22 S.E.2d 9 (1942)
did the court give a more comprehensive statement of the rule (see note 25 supra). It was
drawn, however, from the briefs of counsel rather than from previous decisions. Id. at 229, 22
S.E.2d at 12.
27. See note 16 supra. The uncertainty referred to is that created by the 1968 decision in
Crabbe v. School Bd., 209 Va. 356, 164 S.E.2d 639 (1968); Annot., 33 A.L.R.3rd 697 (1968).
In holding that a high school shop teacher was not immune from liability for negligently
allowing a student to use a power saw which the teacher knew was defective (as a result of
which the plaintiff's hand was injured), the court made no mention of the ministerial-
discretionary distinction. In the light of past decisions and the fact that an appropriate
opportunity to apply the rule was missed, this seems odd. In applying the rationale of pre-
vious decisions, it would seem that the duties of the shop teacher in Crabbe were no less
discretionary than those of the intern in Lawhorne (the teacher had to decide whether or not
certain equipment could be used). This is precisely the point brought out in Justice Cochran's
dissent in Lawhorne.
Apparently the court in Crabbe disregarded prior case law, and it is quite difficult to
determine, on the basis of the imprecise language used just what rationale the court relied
on in arriving at its decision. The court ruled that the fact that the defendant was performing
a governmental function for his employer does not mean that he was exempt from liability
for his own negligence in the performance of such duties (citing no authorities) and that a
state employee may be held liable for negligent conduct in the performance of his duties
although the state itself is immune therefrom (citing Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 155 S.E.2d
639 (1967); as previously pointed out, Elder was an intentional tort case and negligence
questions were not involved (see note 26 supra)). All of this is quite nebulous.
It is of interest that the opinion in Lawhorne passes Crabbe off as a possible case of gross
negligence and therefore within one of the "exceptions" to the discretionary employees rule
(see note 25 supra). 214 Va. at 407, 200 S.E.2d at 572. The Crabbe opinion, however, does
not mention this possibility, and it is in no way apparent that the decision turned on it.
Whether the discretionary employee argument was omitted in Crabbe as a result of oversights
in the briefs of counsel or was actually a feeble attempt to change the law, the decision therein
represents an inconsistency in Virginia case law, and to the extent that Crabbe conflicts
therewith it would seem that the Crabbe decision has been impliedly overruled by Lawhorne.
28. Admittedly, the ministerial-discretionary distinction does not lend itself to a "test"
type approach, and the cases have not dealt with the distinction in this manner. The decisions
have turned on whether the state employee has been required to exercise his judgment in
carrying out his duties. See note 9 supra.
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country.n However, irrespective of the merits of such a change, the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court has been particularly strict in the application of stare
decisis, and the possibility of judicial abolition of so firmly entrenched a
doctrine as sovereign immunity seems remote .3 The Lawhorne decision
certainly gives no indication that the abolition of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is imminent in Virginia.3'
A.D.B.
29. On the theory that it is obsolete and unresponsive to modem social needs, the following
jurisdictions have abolished the sovereign immunity rule in whole or in part by judicial
decision: Arizona, Stone v. Arizona H'way Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Arkan-
sas, Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Florida, Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach,
96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Illinois, Molliter v. Kaneland Comm. Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163
N.E.2d 89 (1959); Kentucky, Haney v. Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Michigan,
Williams v. Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961); Minnesota, Spanel v. Mounds View
School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962); Nebraska, Brown v. Omaha, 183 Neb.
430, 160 N.W.2d 805 (1968); Wisconsin, Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618
(1962).
30. The reservations expressed by the Virginia court concerning the abolition of immuni-
ties in Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Oakes, 200 Va. 878, 108 S.E.2d 388 (1959) fully sums up the
problem. In refusing to abolish charitable immunities the court said:
[Tihe doctrine . . . is firmly embedded in the law of this Commonwealth and has
become a part of the general public policy of the state. The General Assembly, though
composed of many lawyers of outstanding ability throughout the years, has not seen
fit to enact legislation abrogating the doctrine. By its silence, approval might well be
inferred. If it be considered desirable to abolish such immunity, it would be more
appropriate for the General Assembly to act, for the effect would be to act prospec-
tively. Abandonment of the rule by judicial decision would be retroactive and give life
to tort claims not barred by the statute of limitation at the time of rendition of the
opinion. Id. at 889, 108 S.E.2d at 396.
Such statements apply equally to sovereign immunity.
Fears of retroactivity are groundless. A decision to abrogate sovereign immunity may be
made to operate prospectively. See Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118
N.W.2d 795 (1962). Prospective abrogation could be undertaken in Virginia by either
legislative or judicial initiative.
The courts of nine jurisdictions have felt no restraint in judicially abolishing their immun-
ity rules. See note 29 supra. One of the chief problems in this area has been the Virginia
legislature's failure to act. Other than to provide for waiver of immunity in school bus cases
(see VA. CODE ANN. § 22-290 (1950) and note 14 supra), the General Assembly has acted only
retrogressively. Shortly after Hoggard v. Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 200 S.E. 610 (1939), which
allowed an action to be maintained against a city for negligence in the operation of a park,
the General Assembly practically reinstated the immunity rule by requiring a showing of
gross negligence as a prerequisite to such a suit. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-291 (1950) and
note 14 supra.
31. Of particular interest in this context is the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's statement
in Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 26, 115 N.W.2d 618, 623 (1962): "We are satisfied that the
governmental immunity doctrine has judicial origins. Upon careful consideration we are now
of the opinion that it is appropriate for this court to abolish this immunity notwithstanding
the legislature's failure to adopt corrective enactments."

